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Abstract This paper presents a novel treatment of quantified concealed questions
(CQs), examining different types of NP predicates and deriving the truth conditions
for pair-list and set readings. A generalization is proposed regarding the distribution
of the two readings, namely that pair-list readings arise from CQs with relational
head nouns, whereas set readings arise from CQs whose head nouns are not (or no
longer) relational. It is shown that set readings cannot be derived under the ‘indi-
vidual concept’ approach, one of the most influential analyses of CQs on the market.
The paper offers a solution to this problem. It shows that once we adopt an
independently motivated view of traces—according to which traces are copies
with descriptive content (Fox, Linguist Inq 30:157–196, 1999; Fox, Linguist Inq
33:63–96, 2002)—nothing else needs to be postulated to derive set readings within
an individual-concept-based analysis. Thus, what seemed to be a challenge for this
type of analysis turns out to be an argument in its favor.
Keywords Concealed questions  Individual concepts  Attitude ascriptions 
Descriptive traces
1 Introduction
Concealed questions (henceforth, CQs) are DPs whose interpretation can be
paraphrased by an embedded identity question. An example of a definite DP with a
CQ interpretation is given in (1) below.
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(1) Sue found out the gender of her baby.
(= Sue found out what the gender of her baby was)
CQs are also possible with quantified DP objects. Interestingly, such cases are often
ambiguous. As pointed out by Heim (1979) (see also Roelofsen and Aloni 2008),
the sentence in (2) below can have two readings.1 According to one reading—the
pair-list reading—the sentence says that for every existing country x, Mary knows
the answer to the question ‘What is the capital of x?’. According to the other
reading—the set reading—the sentence says that for every existing capital city z,
Mary knows the answer to the question ‘Is z a capital?’, or ‘Is z the capital of some
country?’. Crucially, under this second reading, the attitude holder does not have to
know how to match each capital city to the corresponding country. The readings just
described are truth-conditionally different. In fact, it is easy to imagine scenarios
that would make the set reading true but the pair-list reading false. (The reverse does
not hold: i.e., the pair-list reading entails the set reading, but not the other way
around.)
(2) Mary knows every capital.
Pair-list reading: For every country x, Mary knows what the capital of x is.
Set reading: For every capital city z, Mary knows that z is a capital.
The ambiguity displayed by (2) is quite systematic; in fact, it is found whenever the
head noun of the quantified CQ is relational. Further examples are provided in (3a,b).
(3) a. The secretary knows every phone number (of the employees in this office).
b. The postman knows every zip code (in Massachusetts).
The examples in (3a) (from Heim 1979) and (3b), with the relational nouns phone
number and zip code, are ambiguous in the same way (2) is. Under one reading of (3a),
the secretary knows for every employee in this office what his/her phone number is
(pair-list reading). However, this is not the only reading available. Imagine that the
secretary needs to assign to a new employee a phone number that is not yet taken by
any other employee. In this case, she ‘‘needs to know every phone number not in the
sense of knowing which number is whose, but merely in the sense of knowing which
numbers are somebody’s at all’’ (Heim 1979). Similarly for (3b). Under one reading,
the postman knows for every town in Massachusetts what its zip code is (pair-list
reading). Under the other reading, he simply knows for every actual zip code from
Massachusetts that it is the zip code of some town in Massachusetts (set reading).
The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of quantified CQs which derives
the truth conditions of pair-list and set readings. With respect to the distribution of
the two readings, I propose the following generalization:
1 I am setting aside for the moment another reading of (2), according to which Mary bears some relation
of acquaintance to every capital city. I will return to acquaintance-based readings in Sect. 2.1.
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(4) Distribution of pair-list and set readings:
Pair-list readings arise with CQs headed by relational nouns whose internal
argument has not been saturated (2-place predicate NPs; semantic type
\e\e,t[[). Set readings arise with CQs headed by nouns that are not—or no
longer—relational (1-place predicate NPs; semantic type \e,t[).
In support of the claim that set readings correlate with 1-place predicate NPs,
consider the data in (5)–(6) below. In (5), the head noun of the CQ is lexically not
relational, whereas in (6) the head noun of the CQ is lexically relational but its
internal argument has been saturated. In both cases, the NP-CQ denotes a 1-place
predicate (semantic type \e,t[) and the sentences are preferably interpreted as
having set readings.2
(5) Julio knows every book that Rita read this summer.
CQ set reading: For every actual book x that Rita read this summer (Anna
Karenina, Les Misérables, etc.) Julio knows that x is a book that Rita read
this summer.
(6) Bob knows every member of the Italian soccer team.
CQ set reading: For every actual member x of the Italian soccer team (Pirlo,
Buffon, etc.), Bob knows that x is a member of the Italian soccer team.
However, one may be wondering, if the generalization stated in (4) is correct, why
are sentences with 2-place NP-CQs, like (2) and (3), still ambiguous? Shouldn’t
they have just pair-list readings? I propose that the ambiguity of sentences with
2-place NP-CQs follows from the fact that relational nouns, just like transitive
verbs, can occur as either transitive (2-place: \e\e,t[[) or intransitive (1-place:
\e,t[) predicates (cf. Barker 1995; Partee 1983/1997, a.o.), with the first type
generating pair-list readings and the second set readings.
The account of quantified CQs I propose is cast within the ‘individual concept’
approach (henceforth, IC-approach).3 I start by showing that the version of the
IC-approach provided by Heim (1979) and Romero (2005) to account for definite
CQs can be extended to quantified CQs with functional nouns (pair-list readings).
This is implemented by allowing quantification over meaningfully sorted concepts
(cf. Nathan 2006). Quantification over suitable concepts, however, cannot be the
2 It is possible to contextually force a relational interpretation of the noun and make pair-list readings
available in these cases too. For example, member of the Italian soccer team could be interpreted as a
function mapping each individual member of the team to the role he plays as a member of the team.
Under this interpretation of the noun, it is possible to generate a pair-list reading according to which Bobo
has to know for each individual what his role in the team is. However, when the noun is interpreted as a
1-place predicate, the sentence only has a set reading.
3 A different account of quantified CQs within the IC-approach is given in Romero (2010). A comparison
with Romero’s analysis is left for future research.
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right tool to account for set readings, which involve quantification over individuals.
I argue that the challenge presented by set readings and, more generally, by CQs
headed by nouns that are neither functional nor relational can be overcome within
an IC-based approach if we adopt an independently motivated view of traces (Fox
1999, 2002). Once we adopt the view that traces are copies with descriptive content,
nothing else needs to be said to derive set readings within the IC-approach. Thus,
what seemed to be a challenge for this type of analysis turns out to be an argument
in its favor. In the last part of the paper, I return to pair-list readings to show that
quantification over suitable concepts cannot account for pair-list readings with
nouns that are relational but not functional. Such cases, I argue, require
quantification over pairs of individuals, rather than concepts.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 introduces the IC-
approach for simple definite CQs (Heim 1979; Romero 2005). Section 3 extends
Heim/Romero’s IC-approach to quantified CQs with functional nouns (pair-list
readings). Section 4 shows that the extended version of the IC-approach cannot
account for quantified CQs with set readings. Section 5 proposes a solution to this
problem by showing that set readings can be derived within an IC-based approach
by assuming the copy theory of movement and a mechanism for interpreting copy
traces along the lines of Fox’s trace conversion. Section 6 addresses pair-list
readings with nouns that are relational but not functional, which require one further
amendment to the original IC-approach.
2 Definite CQs and the individual concept approach
2.1 Background: Acquaintance and CQ-readings
Some examples of definite DPs with CQ-readings are given in (7) below.
(7) a. She found out the murderer without going to the CSI forensic lab.
a0. She found out who the murderer was without going to the CSI forensic lab.
b. Ruben knows Eva’s phone number.
b0. Ruben knows what Eva’s phone number is.
c. Paula knows Luis’s favorite city.
c0. Paula knows what Luis’s favorite city is.
Notice that while sentences (7a,b) feel unambiguous, (7c) has another reading aside
from its CQ-paraphrase in (7c0). Under this other interpretation, the sentence says
that Paula bears some relation of familiarity to a certain city, which happens to be
Luis’s favorite city. Crucially under this reading, which I will call the acquaintance
reading, Paula does not have to know that the city in question is Luis’s favorite city
(i.e. the DP-object can have an epistemically neutral interpretation). Since Heim
(1979), it is commonly assumed that the ambiguity between CQ and acquaintance
readings of sentences like (1c) is due to the fact that the English predicate know is




4,5 Acquaintance readings correlate with the use of
extensional know2. Such cases are unproblematic and their interpretation can be
derived in a way analogous to (8).
(8) Ruben dialed Eva’s phone number.
Obviously, for (8) to be true Ruben does not have to know that the number he dialed
is Eva’s phone number (the DP-object can be epistemically neutral). Similarly,
under the acquaintance reading of (7c), Paula may be personally acquainted with
Luis’s favorite city without knowing that it is in fact Luis’s favorite city.
While acquaintance readings follow straightforwardly from basic principles of
semantic composition, CQ-readings are much more challenging. In (7a–c), I
paraphrased each underlined CQ with an embedded question. Is this just a useful
way to describe their meaning intuitively, or should we say that, although they
surface as DPs, CQs are actually questions at some deeper level of representation? If
not, how can we account for their apparent question-like meanings?
Over the past forty years, a range of accounts has been proposed for the
interpretation of CQs with definite DPs. According to some approaches inspired by
Grimshaw (1979), the denotation of a CQ must be shifted into the denotation of the
corresponding copular question (through an especially devised type-shifter). Under
this type of approach a sentence like (7b) above is analyzed along the lines of (9a).
Romero (2007) and Nathan (2006), on the other hand, argue that CQs must be
shifted into propositions and that a CQ-sentence like (7b), should be analyzed along
the lines of (9b). Frana (2006) and Schwager (2008) argue that CQs denote
properties and that a CQ-reading expresses a de re belief ascription, with the DP-CQ
providing both the individual (res) argument and the property ascribed to it by the
holder of the attitude (9c), linking the analysis of CQs to the factivity of the
embedding predicate (Kratzer 1990, 2002). Finally, Heim (1979) entertains the
hypothesis, later developed by Romero (2005), that CQs denote individual concepts
(functions from indices to individuals) and that a CQ-sentence like (7b) should be
4 As noted in the literature (Heim 1979; Romero 2005, a.o.), the lexical ambiguity hypothesis is
supported by the fact that other languages distinguish between two different predicates corresponding to
know; e.g. German wissen/kennen, Spanish saber/conocer, and Italian sapere/conoscere. When wissen/
saber/sapere are allowed to take a DP-object, the sentence cannot receive an acquaintance reading. This
is shown in (i) below for Italian:
(i) Gianni sa la capitale del Congo. *acquaintance
‘Gianni knows the capital of Congo.’ (= ‘Gianni knows what the capital of Congo is’)
5 The reason why (7a) is not ambiguous is because find out, unlike know (but like other predicates such
as guess or predict), is unambiguously epistemic. As for (7b), an acquaintance reading is presumably
made implausible by the fact that people are not normally acquainted with abstract objects like
numbers—at least not in a way that would license the use of the acquaintance-based know2. The Italian
sentence in (i) below with conoscere is marked, unless it is made clear from the context that the number is
used as a device to identify a person (e.g. a prisoner).
(i) #Luisa conosce 01762254.
‘Luisa knows 01762254.’
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analyzed along the lines of (9d).6 As suggested by the paraphrases below, all the
existing approaches, although conceptually different, produce equivalent truth
conditions for simple CQ-sentences with definite descriptions, like our examples in
(7a–c).7
(9) Type-logical classification of CQ-analyses
a. CQs as questions: Ruben knows what Eva’s phone number is.
(Harris 2007; Aloni 2008; Roelofsen and Aloni 2008; Percus 2009, 2010)
b. CQs as propositions: Ruben knows that Eva’s phone number is what
Eva’s phone number actually is. (Romero 2007; Nathan 2006)
c. CQs as properties: Ruben believes de re of Eva’s actual phone number
that it is Eva’s phone number. (Frana 2006; Schwager 2008)
d. CQs as individual concepts: The value that the individual concept ‘Eva’s
phone number’ yields at the actual world and at Ruben’s belief
worlds is the same. (Heim 1979; Romero 2005; Frana 2010)
In this paper, I will frame my account of quantified CQs within an individual-
concept-based analysis. Heim (1979) suggests that definite descriptions with
CQ-readings, like the underlined DP in (10), may be analyzed on a par with definite
descriptions in temporally intensional contexts, like the underlined DP in (11).
(10) Julio knows the temperature in this room.
(11) The temperature in this room is rising.
While in (11), the temporally intensional predicate is rising forces us to look at
temperature values at earlier and later (temporal) indices, the epistemic predicate
know in (10) forces us to compare temperature values at different (world) indices
(the actual world w and the worlds according to John’s beliefs in w). Given the
Montagovian treatment of sentences like (10) in terms of individual concepts
(Montague 1974), Heim suggests that an analogous analysis could be given for (10).
2.2 Definite CQs as individual concepts
The original argument for the introduction of individual concepts is due to
Montague’s (1974) analysis of the temperature paradox, attributed to Barbara
Partee. Partee’s observation is that in contrast to the valid argument in (12) below,
the syllogism in (13) is intuitively invalid: by substitution, the first two sentences
appear to lead to the invalid conclusion in (13c).
6 For more detailed overviews of CQ-analyses in the literature see Nathan (2006) and Romero (2006).
7 The main difference among the aforementioned CQ-analyses is whether the crucial type-shift operation
applies to the DP-CQ directly (question/proposition approaches) or whether it is incorporated in a
designated lexical entry for the embedding predicate (property/individual concept approaches). Thanks to
Kyle Rawlins for discussing this point with me.
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(12) a. The mayor of Northampton is Ms. Higgins.
b. The mayor of Northampton lives on Main St.
c. Ms. Higgins lives on Main St.
(13) a. The temperature in this room is ninety.
b. The temperature in this room is rising.
c. Ninety is rising.
Montague’s account of the contrast between the valid argument in (12) and the (invalid)
temperature paradox in (13) has three major components.8 First, definite descriptions
like the mayor of Northampton and the temperature in this room do notdenote individual
entities, but rather individual concepts, i.e. functions from indices (world/time pairs) to
entities. These functions, as opposed to the constant functions denoted by proper names
like Ms. Higgins and ninety, can yield different values at different indices. Second,
Montague assumes that equative be, as in The temperature is 90 or The mayor is Ms.
Higgins, expresses extensional identity. Thus, as can be seen in (14a) and (15a) below,
the first premise of both arguments does not assert that two ICs are identical, but rather
that their extensions are the same at the index of evaluation. Finally, according to
Montague, the significant difference between the valid argument in (12) and the
temperature paradox lies in the kind of predication involved in the second premise.
While in (14b) the extensional predicate lives on Main Street applies to the value of
the function denoted by the mayor of Northampton (f) at the index of evaluation, in
(15b) the (temporally) intensional predicate rise applies to the function denoted by the
temperature in this room (f0), not to its value. (Intuitively, in order to establish whether
the temperature is rising, one needs to look not just at the actual temperature value, but
also at the values that the function yields at earlier and later indices.)
(14) a. The mayor of Northampton is Ms Higgins.
f(i0) = g(i0) extensional identity
b. The mayor of Northampton lives on Main
Street.
lives-on-MSi0 (f(i0)) extensional predication
c. Ms Higgins lives on Main Street.
lives-on-MSi0 (g(i0))
(15) a. The temperature in this room is ninety.
f0(i0) = g0(i0) extensional identity
b. The temperature in this room is rising.
risei0 (f0) intensional predication
c. Ninety is rising.
risei0 (g0)
It is easy to see that from the truth of (14a,b) the truth of (14c) must follow. The
same does not hold for (15). Given that the temperature function that yields 90 at i0
can be different from the constant function that yields 90 at all indices, (15a,b) can
be true even if (15c) is false. Therefore, the paradox is resolved.
8 What follows is a simplified version of Montague’s original analysis. (Cf. Montague 1974, pp. 30–31.)
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In analogy to the temperature paradox, Heim (1979) proposes the following
invalid argument involving CQ-readings of the DPs in italics.
(16) a. The capital of Italy is the largest town in Italy.
b. John knows the capital of Italy.
c. John knows the largest town in Italy. (Heim 1979, p. 54)
The entailment in (16) does not go through if we assume that the DPs in italics are
interpreted as CQs. Intuitively, knowing what the capital of Italy is does not entail
knowing what the largest town in Italy is, despite the fact that the two DPs are co-
referential at the actual world/time index. As Heim points out, the lack of entailment
is expected if the CQs in (16) denote individual concepts and know can select for
individual concepts. On a par with Montague’s analysis of the temperature paradox,
(16) can be analyzed as in (17) below.
(17) a. The capital of Italy is the largest town in Italy.
f(i0) = g(i0) extensional identity
b. John knows the capital of Italy.
knowi0 (f)(john) intensional predication
c. John knows the largest town in Italy.
knowi0 (g)(john)
Setting aside the semantic interpretation of know for the moment, the failure of
entailment can be explained by assuming that equating the value of two concepts at
the actual index (17a) is not enough to guarantee identity across indices. Therefore,
the conclusion in (17c) does not follow from the premises of the argument.
2.3 Romero (2005): knowCQ-se
Building on Heim (1979), Romero (2005) develops a detailed analysis of CQs
embedded under epistemic know. Romero’s denotation for know as a predicate
selecting for individual concepts is given in (18) below (where Doxx(w) stands for
the set of worlds compatible with what the attitude holder x believes in world w, i.e.
the set of x’s doxastic alternatives to w).9,10
(18) [[knowCQ-se]]
w = kf\s,e[ kxe. Vw0 [ Doxx(w) [f(w0) = f(w)]
9 Romero (2005) uses a notation with world variables in the metalanguage (2-sorted type theory). For
consistency’s sake, all the formulas from her paper are translated into the notation used in this paper.
10 Romero emphasizes that an IC-based analysis of CQs with epistemic know is a parsimonious extension
of the analysis assumed for question-embedding know, whose entry is given in (i).
(i) [[knowQ]]
w = kQ\\s,t[,t[ kxe. Vw0 [ Doxx(w) [Q(w0) = Q(w)]
According to Romero, ‘‘the parallelism between Karttunen’s question meaning and the individual concept
in [(19), i.e. kw0. [[the capital of Italy]]w
0
] is obvious. A question maps a world to a possibly non-singleton
set of propositions. For example, [[[CP what is the capital of Italy]] maps the actual world w to the
singleton {kw0.capital-of(rome, italy, w0)}. An individual concept maps a world to a possibly non-
singular individual. For example, the individual concept contributed by [NP the capital of Italy] maps the
actual world w to the singular individual Rome.’’ (Romero 2005, p. 693)
186 I. Frana
123
Although Romero does not explicitly argue in favor of any particular method of
deriving the individual concept argument of knowCQ-se, one way to obtain such
argument is via Intensional Functional Application (IFA), defined in (19) below.
(19) Intensional Functional Application (Heim and Kratzer 1998)
If a is a branching node and {b, c} the set of its daughters, then, for any
possible world w and any assignment a, if [[b]]w,a is a function whose
domain contains kw0. [[c]]w
0,a, then [[a]]w,a = [[b]]w,a (kw0. [[c]]w
0,a).
The truth conditions of a simple CQ-sentence like (20) can then be compositionally
derived as shown in (21) below.
(20) John knows the capital of Italy.
CQ: John knows what the capital of Italy is.
(21) a. [[the capital of Italy]]w,g = ixe [x is capital of Italy in w]
b. [[John knows the capital of Italy]]w,g =
= [[knowCQ-se]]
w,g (kw*. [[the capital of Italy]]w*,g)([[John]]w,g)
= Vw0[ DoxJ(w) [(kw*.[[the capital of Italy]]
w*,g (w0)) =
(kw*.[[the capital of Italy]]w*,g (w))]
= Vw0[ DoxJ(w) [ixe [x is capital of Italy in w0] =
ixe [x is capital of Italy in w]]
According to the formula above, the sentence John knows the capital of Italy is true
in the world of evaluation w iff all of John’s belief worlds w0 are such that the unique
individual that is the capital of Italy in those belief worlds is the unique individual
that is the capital of Italy in the actual world (i.e., in each world compatible with
John’s beliefs in the actual world, the capital of Italy is Rome). These truth conditions
correctly capture the intuitive interpretation of the sentence under its CQ-reading.
In the next section, I will move on to quantified CQ-objects. I will start by
addressing quantified CQs with pair-list readings. Specifically, I am going to show
that the IC-analysis just described can be extended to quantified CQs with functional
nouns. I will only later return to set readings and pair-list readings with
nonfunctional nouns and show how these cases will force us to make more
substantial amendments to the original IC-approach.
3 Quantified CQs and pair-list readings: functional nouns
In this section, I propose an extension of Heim/Romero’s IC-analysis that accounts
for pair-list readings with functional nouns. The account presented here can be seen
as a natural extension of Romero’s (2005) analysis of definite CQs, enriched by
observations from Nathan (2006) on the nature of predicates of individual concepts.
3.1 Quantification over concepts
In Sect. 2.2, I showed that definite CQs could be derived by combining an
individual-denoting DP with Romero’s entry for knowCQ-se by IFA. This simple
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machinery, however, won’t work for examples with a quantified CQ-object, like
(22).
(22) a. Mary knows every capital.
b. Pair-list reading: For every country x, Mary knows what the capital
of x is.
According to standard assumptions, a quantified DP does not denote an individual,
nor could it denote the intension of an individual (i.e., an individual concept). Hence
it cannot serve directly as the internal argument of knowCQ-se. Type mismatches of
this sort, however, are commonly resolved by raising the problematic quantifica-
tional phrase to a higher position (via Quantifier Raising, QR), leaving a trace of the
appropriate semantic type in the starting position. In the case at hand, the trace left
by QR-movement of the quantified DP must be of type \s,e[ (i.e., the semantic
type of a concept) in order to combine with knowCQ-se, as (23) below shows.
(23)
every   capital<se,t> XP: <se,t>
λ f1<s,e>
Mary
knowCQ-se   f1<s,e>
In (23), the quantificational determiner every must relate two sets of individual
concepts: the set denoted by capital and the set denoted by kf1 Mary knows f1. Thus,
the pair-list reading of (22a) could be derived by quantifying over individual
concepts corresponding to different capital-concepts, as shown in (24).
(24) Vf\s,e[ (capital (f) ? knowCQ-se (f)(mary))
(For every f\s,e[ such that f is a capital concept, Mary knowsCQ-se f.)
Before moving on, let’s take note of the fact that the analysis just sketched here
requires the NP-CQ capital to denote a predicate of individual concepts (henceforth
abbreviated as IC-predicate), an assumption that was not required in the case of
definite CQs (recall that in order to derive CQ-readings for definite descriptions, the
IC-argument of knowCQ-se was crafted by taking the intension of the individual
denoted by the definite).
When combining the analysis sketched in (24) with Romero’s entry for knowCQ-se,
we derive the following truth conditions for (22a):
(25) [[Mary knows every capital]]g,w =
Vf\se[ (capital (f) ? Vw0 [ DoxM (w) [f(w0) = f(w)])
According to the formula in (25), checking for the truth of (22a) (under its pair-list
reading) amounts to checking whether every capital concept in the set picked out by
188 I. Frana
123
the IC-predicate capital yields the same value at the actual world w and at Mary’s
belief worlds. Do these truth conditions match our understanding of (22a) under the
pair-list reading? In other words, are the inferences in (26) guaranteed by the truth
conditions in (25)?
(26) Desired inferences for the pair-list reading of (22a):
Mary knows that the capital of Italy is Rome, that the capital of France is
Paris, that the capital of Argentina is Buenos Aires, etc., for all existing
capital-country combinations.
As we will see in the next section, the answer to this question heavily depends on
how we define the denotation of the NP-CQ capital as an IC-predicate. Under this
analysis, the set of inferences in (26) can be derived only if the set of concepts
picked out by capital consists of meaningfully sorted capital concepts (i.e., concepts
like the capital of Italy, the capital of France, etc.), as opposed to functions
consisting of arbitrary mappings from worlds to capital cities. In the next section, I
present a way of deriving the right domain of concepts by means of a special type-
shifter: Nathan’s IC-shifter (Nathan 2006).
3.2 Nathan’s IC-shifter
The goal of this section is to find a type-shifter that would shift the standard
denotation of a noun like capital—which we independently need for extensional
contexts like (27)—into a predicate of meaningfully sorted concepts.
(27) This summer Julio visited a European capital/ the capital of Italy.
To show that this is not a trivial matter, consider first the following (wrong) attempt.
Assume that (29) is uttered in the context provided in (28) below.
(28) Context 1: Suppose the world consisted of only two countries, Italy and France.
Assume further that the capitals of these countries are Rome and Paris,
respectively, and that Mary is aware of that.
(29) Mary knows every capital.
Pair-list reading: For every country x, Mary knows what the capital of x is.
Intuitively, the pair-list reading of (29) is true in Context 1. Assuming that capital
denotes the 1-place predicate in (30) below, we would end up with the toy model in
(31) below for Context 1. Under this model, the only existing capitals in the actual
world w and in Mary’s belief worlds w0 are Rome and Paris.
(30) [[capital]]w = kxe. x is a capital in w. \e,t[
(31) Toy model 1
[[capital]]w = {Rome, Paris} actual world
[[capital]]w
0
= {Rome, Paris} Mary’s doxastic alternatives
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Returning to our initial hypothesis: the pair-list reading of (29) should result by
quantifying over the concepts in the set denoted by capital, as shown in (25).
However, in our model the extension of capital in a given world is a set of
individuals, not a set of concepts. One way to fix this type-problem is to say that the
lexicon contains a type-shifter that applies to 1-place predicates and returns IC-
predicates. (33) below would do.
(32) Type-shift 1 (preliminary version; Nathan 2006, p. 92)
[[SHIFT(P)]]w = kf\s,e[. Vw0 [[[P]]
w0 (f(w0))] where P is of type \e,t[
What (32) does is this. It takes a predicate P of type \e,t[ and forms a corresponding
predicate Q of type \\s,e[,t[ that satisfies the following condition: each concept
f in Q is such that for every world w0, the individual value of f at w0 has the property
P at w0. However, once we apply the type-shift in (32) to the denotation of capital in
our toy model 1, things go wrong. As (33) below shows, the set of concepts generated
in this way would contain the two concepts c1 and c2, which intuitively correspond to
the concepts standing for the capital of France and the capital of Italy in Context 1, but
also two extra functions c3 and c4, which in this particular model/scenario are nothing
more than arbitrary functions mapping worlds into capitals.
(33) [[SHIFT(capital)]]w = kf\s,e[. Vw*. [capitalw* (f(w*))]
Moreover, if the set picked out by (33) were our domain of quantification, (29)
would come out false, contrary to intuitions. This is because it is not the case that for
every capital concept f in (33), the value of f is the same at w and w0. Thus, the
conclusion seems to be that c3 and c4 should not count as capital-concepts in this
particular context.
Consider next (35) in the scenario provided in (34) below.
(34) Context 2: Suppose the world consisted of only two countries, Italy and
France. Assume that the capitals of these countries are Rome and Paris,
respectively. This time, though, Mary wrongly believes that Paris is the
capital of Italy and Rome is the capital of France.
(35) Mary knows two capitals.
Pair-list reading: There are two countries x and y, such that Mary knows
what the capital of x is and what the capital of y is.
Intuitively, the pair-list reading of (35) is false in Context 2. However, if we were to
assume that capital denotes the 1-place predicate in (30) above, we would have to
represent the facts given in Context 2 by the very same toy model we had before, i.e.
(31). As a consequence, when capital undergoes the type-shifter in (32), we would end
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up with the same set of concepts in our domain, i.e. (33). This time, though, the
concepts that intuitively correspond to the capital of France and the capital of Italy in
Context 2 are c3 and c4, not c1 and c2. Moreover, if we included c1 and c2 into our
domain of quantification, we would wrongly predict (35) to be true. This is because
there are in fact two concepts (namely, c1 and c2) whose values are the same at w0 and
w. The conclusion seems to be then that we are clearly doing something wrong here.
Based on a problematic case analogous to the two cases just presented, Nathan
(2006) argues that the individual concepts picked out by the IC-predicate denotation
of relational nouns must be individuated on the basis of the noun’s internal
argument.11 Thus, capital is specified in the lexicon not as the 1-place predicate in
(30), but as the 2-place predicate in (36). This 2-place predicate can then be shifted
into an IC-predicate via the type-shifter in (37) below.12
(36) [[capital]]w = kxe. kye. y is the capital of x in w. \e\e,t[[
(37) Nathan’s IC-shifter (Nathan 2006)
[[IC(a)]]w = kf\s,e[ Axe Vw0 [[a]]
w0(x)(f(w0))
Let’s see how Nathan’s IC-shifter picks out the right set of concepts for our
CQ-sentences. Returning to Context 1, an application of Nathan’s IC-type shifter to
the relational denotation of capital in (38) below creates the right set of concepts, as
shown in (39).
(38) Toy model 10
[[capital]]w = {\IT, Rome[, \FR, Paris[} actual world
[[capital]]w
0
= {\IT, Rome[, \FR, Paris[} Mary’s doxastic alternatives
(39) [[IC(capital)]]w = kf\s,e[ Axe Vw0 [f(w0) is the capital of x at w0]
Given (37), only functions that are individuated on the basis of the particular country
they are ‘‘capitals of’’ will be in the set picked out by IC(capital). In this case, the two
concepts c3 and c4 from (33) will not be part of the set of ICs picked out by IC(capital)
in Toy model 10. This is because neither of the two functions satisfies the condition
imposed by (37), according to which for a function f to be part of the set denoted by
IC(capital), there has to be an x such that, at every index w, f(w) is the capital of x at w.
Let us move on to Context 2. The denotation of capital in this scenario is given in
the toy model 2 in (40) below.
11 Nathan’s original argument was based on quantification over concepts in temporally intensional
contexts (as in Every governor changed). Here, I adapt Nathan’s discussion to CQs, but the logic of the
argument is basically the same.
12 The internal argument of the relational noun does not have to be an individual; it can also be a kind
(e.g. the internal argument of price in John knows every price). Following Carlson (1977) this won’t
require any change with respect to semantic types, given that kinds are also of semantic type e.
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(40) Toy model 2
[[capital]]w = {\IT, Rome[, \FR, Paris[} actual world
[[capital]]w
0
= {\IT, Paris[, \FR, Rome[} Mary’s doxastic alternatives
Applying Nathan’s IC-shifter to the denotation of capital in (40) yields a different
set of concepts, as shown in (41) below.
(41)
These functions correspond to concepts c3 and c4 in (33). If we assume (41) as our
domain of quantification, the sentence in (35) is now correctly predicted to be false.
This is because it is not the case that there exist two capital-concepts in our domain
whose values are the same at the actual world w and at Mary’s belief worlds w0 (as a
matter of fact none of the concepts in our domain are).
3.3 Deriving pair-list readings with functional nouns
Once we have the right denotation for IC(capital), we can derive the pair-list
reading of (22a), repeated in (42), compositionally. This is shown in (43) below.
(42) a. Mary knows every capital.
b. Pair-list reading: For every country x, Mary knows what the capital of x is.
(43)
a. Lexical entries
1. [[IC(capital)]]w,g = k,f\s,e[ Axe Vw* [f(w*) is the capital of x at w*]
2. [[every]]w,g = kP\\s,e[,t[. kQ\\s,e[,t[. Vf\s,e[ [P(f) ? Q(f)]
3. [[knowCQ-se]]
w,g = kf\s,e[ kxe.Vw0 [ Doxx(w) [f(w0) = f(w)]
4. [[Mary]]w,g = m
b. Truth conditions
[[Mary knows every capital]]w,g =




According to the formula above, the pair-list reading of the sentence Mary knows
every capital is true in a world w iff every properly individuated capital concept
yields the same value at w and at Mary’s belief worlds w0.
Summing up, the account just presented derives pair-list readings by quantifying
over a domain of meaningfully sorted concepts. Such domain is provided by the
denotation of the NP-CQ after it undergoes Nathan’s IC-shifter. Because of the way
the shifter is defined, only concepts that are properly individuated (i.e., that are
individuated on the basis of the relational noun’s internal argument) will be
included in the domain of quantification. Thus, checking for the truth of a quantified
sentence like Mary knows every capital under its pair-list reading amounts to
checking whether each (properly individuated) capital concept yields the same value
at the actual world w and at all the worlds according to Mary’s beliefs in w.
3.4 A note on restrictive modification
There are examples of pair-list readings in which a 2-place predicate NP-CQ is
modified by an adjective or a prepositional phrase, as in (44a,b) below. As the
paraphrases suggest, in these examples the modifier seems to contribute information
about the internal argument of the relational noun.
(44) a. The cashier knows every price in the store.
a0. For every item (for sale) in the store, the cashier knows what its price is.
b. John knows every European capital.
b0. For every European country, John knows what its capital is.
As the paraphrases above show, when interpreting the sentences in (44a,b), we are
confining our attention to individual concepts that are individuated on the basis of
items sold in the store and of European countries. These intuitive paraphrases can be
captured by having the modifier restricting the internal argument of the noun via the
semantic mode of composition Restrict in (45) below (Chung and Ladusaw 2004).
(45) Restrict ([[R\e,\e,t[[]]
w,g, [[P\e,t[]]
w,g) = kxe. kye . ([[R]]
w,g(x)(y) &
[[P]]w,g (x))
Similar examples were pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer, who was
concerned that the apparent saturation of the noun internal argument in examples
like (46) below would lead to the (wrong) expectation that these sentences can only
have set readings.
(46) a. Mary knows every capital of a European country.
b. Mike knows every phone number of a high-ranking administrator.
I suggest that the examples above could be treated in an analogous fashion as the
examples in (44a,b), i.e. with the underlined material restricting—not saturating—
the internal argument of the noun, as shown in (47) below.
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(47) a. [[capital]]w,g = kxe. kye [y is the capital of x in w]
b. [[European country]]w,g = kxe [x is a country in the EU in w]
c. [[capital (of a) EU country]]w,g = Restrict ([[capital]]w,g,
[[(of a) EU country]]w,g)
= kxe. kye [y is the capital of x at w & x is a country in the EU in w]
Given that the internal argument of the relational noun is restricted but not saturated,
the NP-CQs in (46a,b) denote 2-place predicates. Hence, these examples are
expected to have pair-list readings.13
4 Back to the ambiguity: pair-list and set readings
4.1 Set readings and nonrelational NPs
In the Introduction we saw that sentences with quantified CQ-objects, like (48)
(repeated from (2)), are ambiguous between pair-list and set readings. We just saw
how pair-list readings can be derived by quantifying over meaningfully sorted
concepts. What about set readings? Can they also be derived by quantifying over
concepts?
(48) Mary knows every capital.
Pair-list reading: For every country x, Mary knows what the capital of x is.
Set reading: For every capital city x, Mary knows that x is a capital.
Unfortunately, the account just provided for pair-list readings is not going to extend
to set readings. As already observed, set readings correlate with 1-place predicate
NPs. These can be NPs whose head noun is lexically nonrelational, like book in (49)
(repeated from (5)), or relational nouns whose internal argument has been overtly
saturated, such as member in (50) (repeated from (6)). In both cases, the semantic
type of the NP-CQ is \e,t[ (1-place predicate) instead of \e,\e,t[[ (2-place
predicate); therefore, Nathan’s IC-shifter cannot even apply to derive a predicate of
individual concepts.14
(49) Julio knows every book that Rita read this year.
Set reading: For every actual book that Rita read this year (Anna Karenina,
Pride and Prejudice, etc.), Julio knows that it is a book that Rita read this
year.
13 The analysis sketched here only derives a narrow scope reading of the embedded indefinite (in fact,
the indefinite is vacuous in this analysis). A sentence like (46b) also has an inverse linking reading (in the
sense of May 1977), where the indefinite has wide scope. I leave the issue of how to derive inverse linking
readings open for future research.
14 Nathan (2006) argues that when a nonrelational noun is modified by a relative clause (RC), as in (49),
a CQ-reading is available because the RC itself acts as a shifter (more precisely, he postulates a special
lexical entry for RCs that combine with nonrelational NP-CQs, where such denotation is created by a
type-shifter operator). See Nathan (2006, pp. 117–120) for details on this proposal.
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(50) Bob knows every member of the Italian soccer team.
Set reading: For every actual member x of the Italian soccer team (Buffon,
Cannavaro, etc.), Bob knows that x is a member of the Italian soccer team.
Given the correlation between 1-place predicates and set readings, I suggest that the
set reading of an ambiguous sentence like (48) is derived by assuming that the
relational noun is used intransitively.
It is well known (cf. Barker 1995; Partee 1983/1997, a.o.) that relational nouns,
like transitive verbs, do not necessarily require their internal argument to be overtly
expressed. In the same way, one could leave the object of the verb ate unexpressed
in (51), and there is no need to specify the internal argument of the relational noun
enemy in (52).
(51) John ate.
(52) The enemy left.
The assumption commonly made in the literature is that relational nouns are listed
in the lexicon as transitive predicates, whereas the intransitive entry is derived by
means of a type-shifter (cf. Barker 1995; Nathan 2006, a.o.). Following the
literature on verbal argument deletion, I will adopt the term indefinite object
deletion (IOD) to refer to the use of a 2-place predicate without an overtly expressed
internal argument. IOD can be implemented in the grammar through a type-shifter
whose semantic effect amounts to existential closure of the noun’s internal
argument. (53) below would do (here a stands for a 2-place predicate: type
\e,\e,t[[).
(53) Indefinite object deletion (IOD)
[[IOD(a)]]w,g = kxe. Aye. [[a]]
w,g(y)(x)
Given the possibility of IOD, relational nouns are systematically ambiguous
between transitive and intransitive meanings, as shown in (54a,b).
(54) a. [[capital]]w,g = kze. kxe. [x is the capital of z at w] \e,\e,t[[
b. [[IOD (capital)]]w,g = kxe. Aye [x is the capital of y at w] \e,t[
This, I argue, is the reason why sentences like (48) are ambiguous between pair-list
readings and set readings. Pair-list readings derive from the relational meaning of
the noun. The IC-approach derives this type of reading by quantifying over
meaningfully sorted ICs (via Nathan’s IC-shifter). On the other hand, when the
relational noun is used intransitively, it is expected to pattern with nonrelational
nouns and generate set readings, which remains to be accounted for. Summing up,
the IC-approach does not obviously extend to quantified CQs with 1-place predicate
NPs as classified in (55).
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(55) 1-place predicate NPs
a. NPs whose head noun is not relational (lexical 1-place predicates)
b. NPs whose head noun is relational with an overtly saturated internal
argument
c. NPs whose head noun is relational with a covertly saturated internal
argument (via IOD)
4.2 Set readings with indefinite CQs
Elsewhere, I pointed out that indefinite CQs are problematic for the IC-approach.
Consider the examples from Frana (2006) in (56) below.
(56) a. John knows a doctor that can treat your illness.
b. Ram knows a shortcut to UMass.
Frana (2006) characterizes the problem as follows:
‘‘When considering indefinites, however, the parallel with individual concepts
becomes much weaker. It is clear that [(56a)], for example, is compatible with
a scenario in which there are several doctors that can treat your illness. All we
need for [(56a)] to be true is that John knows one of them. Thus, the meaning
of a doctor that can treat your illness cannot be described as having an
individual concept denotation, i.e. as a function from points of reference into
single individuals - since at the same point of reference there might be more
than one individual that satisfies the description.’’
It seems to me now that the problem presented by the sentences in (56) is not due to the
fact that these DPs are indefinites (as opposed to definites), but rather to the fact that the
NP-CQ is a 1-place predicate, hence incompatible with Nathan’s IC-shifter. As a matter
of fact, treating indefinite CQs like other quantified phrases (i.e., by assuming QR-
movement) is a viable option when the head noun of the CQ is relational. Consider (56)
below, for instance. Assuming Nathan’s IC-shifter applies to the denotation of the
2-place predicate price, QR-movement delivers the interpretable structure in (57b),
where a trace of type \s,e[ is in the argument position of knowCQ-se.
(57) a. Mary knows a price (in the store).
b. Af\s,e[ ([[IC(price)]]
w,g (f) & [[knowCQ-se]]
w,g(f)(mary))
The problem with the examples in (56) is due to the fact that the head nouns of the
CQs are not relational. What kind of individual concepts could be in the set picked
out by doctor who can treat your illness? Clearly not functions that map an index
w to the unique individual that is a doctor who can treat your illness at w, given that
at the same index there may be more than one doctor who can treat your illness.
Thus, indefinite CQs with 1-place predicate NPs incur the same problem discussed
with respect to quantified CQs with this type of NP, namely the impossibility of
shifting certain NPs into IC-predicates.
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5 Toward an account of set readings
In this section, I argue that the challenge presented by set readings is the direct
consequence of certain assumptions we have made about the interpretation of traces,
i.e. that traces are semantically impoverished objects. Under this view, a trace is
nothing more than a bound variable, whose semantic contribution—in cases in
which the NP-CQ is a 1-place predicate—is rigid. Hence, it cannot be a suitable
argument for an intensional predicate like knowCQ-se. Let’s see why this is the case.
Under the assumption that set readings always correlate with 1-place predicate NPs
(semantic type \e,t[), a possible LF for (58a), is given in (58b) below (here QR
has raised the CQ to a position above knowCQ-se).
(58) a. Mary knows every capital.
b. LF: every IOD (capital) kx1. Mary knowsCQ-se x1 (set reading)
A trace of type e is not, however, the right kind of argument for knowCQ-se. An
application of IFA would rescue the type mismatch, but the truth conditions derived
in this way would be trivially fulfilled, as (59) shows. This is because the intensional
object generated by IFA would be a constant function mapping possible worlds to
the value assumed by the bound variable x1. Thus, the value of such function at the
actual world and at Mary’s belief worlds would necessarily be the same, causing the
whole sentence to be trivially true.
(59) [[Mary knows every IOD(capital)]]w,g =
Vx (Aye [x is the capital of y at w] ?
8w0 2 DoxmðwÞ½ðkw2:[[x1]]w2;g½1=xÞðw0Þ ¼ ðkw3:[[x1]]w3;g½1=xÞðwÞÞ
: Vx (Aye [x is the capital of y at w] ?
Vw0 [ Doxm(w) [[[x1]]
w0,g[1/x] = [[x1]]
w,g[1/x]])
In the next sections I am going to show how the problem described above vanishes once
we adopt an independently motivated view of traces, namely that traces are copies with
semantic content. Following Fox (1999, 2002), traces of ordinary quantified DPs are
definites of type e, which are, in a certain sense, non-rigid: they don’t have an extension
in every possible world. This feature will be crucial to avoid trivial meanings in
combination with knowCQ-se. In the coming two sections, I will start by briefly laying
out independent assumptions that motivate Fox’s copy theory of traces.
5.1 The copy theory of movement
It is well known that in certain environments a moved quantifier phrase or wh-
phrase acts as though it is present in its base position for the purposes of binding
conditions, like Condition C of the binding theory. In (60), for example, the
referring expression John cannot be co-valued with the pronoun he, even though at
surface structure John is not c-commanded by the pronoun he.
(60) * Which picture of Johni does hei like?
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Thus, even though wh-movement removes the name John from the c-command
domain of the pronoun he, the result is ungrammatical in the same way that the
following example without movement is:
(61) * Hei likes which picture of Johni?
In (61), the referring expression John is c-commanded by the co-indexed pronoun,
resulting in a violation of Principle C of the binding theory (and, hence, yielding
ungrammaticality). Since in (60) John cannot be co-referential with the pronoun he,
it is often assumed that the moved phrase is subject to the same binding conditions
as if it were in its base position. Similarly in (62), although QR can move the
universally quantified DP every friend of John’s outside the c-command domain of
the pronoun him, the two expressions cannot be interpreted as co-referential.
(62) ??/* Someone introduced himi to every friend of Johni’s. (Fox 2002, p. 64)
LF: [every friend of Johni’s]j someone introduced himi to tj
The morale from these examples is that neither wh-movement nor QR can reverse
the verdict of Condition C; the moved phrases behave syntactically (and
semantically) as if they were in their base position. Such effects are known as
reconstruction effects.
A prominent recent account of reconstruction effects is the copy theory of
movement (Chomsky 1995). Under the copy theory of movement, movement
operations create a chain of identical copies of the moved constituent. For instance,
to form the question in (60), wh-movement of which picture of John will get the
representation in (63).
(63) * [which picture of Johni] does hei like [which picture of Johni]?
As (63) shows, the gap of the moved phrase is occupied by a copy of the moved
expression, which must be subject to the same requirements that overt phrases are
(in this case, the fact that the referential expression John in the copy trace is
c-commanded by a co-indexed pronoun constitutes a violation of Principle C of the
binding theory). Similarly, in the case of (62), the copy theory of movement will
assign to the sentence the LF in (64), in which a copy, instead of an impoverished
trace, is present at the tail of the movement chain. Given that copy traces are subject
to the same requirements that overt phrases are, the sentence is predicted to be
ungrammatical because of a Principle C violation (the referential expression John in
the copy trace is c-commanded by a co-indexed pronoun).
(64) * [every friend of Johni’s] someone introduced himi to [every friend
of Johni’s]
To conclude, one of the arguments in favor of the copy theory of movement is based
on the observation that movement does not obviate a violation of Condition C. This
fact is mysterious if traces are impoverished objects, but it is expected under the
copy theory of movement, which postulates structures like (63) and (64), where
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copies are subject to the same syntactic restrictions that overt phrases are. I will now
address the question of how copies are interpreted.
5.2 The interpretation of copy traces (Fox 1999, 2002)
What are the consequences, for semantic theory, of adopting the copy theory of
movement? Under a QR-based analysis (cf. May 1977; Heim and Kratzer 1998,
a.o.), the meaning of a sentence involving a quantified phrase in object position, like
(65a) below, is derived by QR-movement of the quantified DP to a higher position.
By effect of such movement a k-binder is introduced at LF, which binds the trace
left by the moved phrase. The resulting property kxi. the teacher talked to xi is then
combined with the denotation of the QP every student by Functional Application.
(65) a. Sue talked to every student.
b. [every student] kxi. Sue talked to xi
In principle, lower copies could also be treated as bound variables. If that were the
case, the copy theory of movement would not introduce any modification with
respect to semantic interpretation. However, according to Fox, the adoption of the
copy theory of movement opens other possibilities. Specifically, ‘‘if operator
variable constructions are to be formed, the copy at the tail of the chain can be
converted to an element that contains a variable in various ways’’ (Fox 2002, p. 66).
Fox’s suggestion is that the copy at the tail of the chain is converted to a definite
description containing a bound variable, yielding an interpretation similar to the
paraphrase in (66b).
(66) a. [every student] Sue talked to [every student]
b. For every student xi, Sue talked to the student xi. (Fox 2002, p. 66)
According to Fox (2002), the definite description the student x in the paraphrase is
modeled after actual definite descriptions such as the man John. These definite
descriptions are interpreted by combining (via Predicate Modification, PM) the
meaning of the first predicate (man) with the identity predicate ky. y = John, with
the resulting predicate serving as the argument of the determiner. Similarly, the
meaning of the copy the student xi in (66b) can be derived by combining (via PM)
the meaning of student with the identity predicate ky. y = xi, with the resulting
predicate serving as an argument of the determiner.
However, how do we get from the copy every student in (66a) to a definite
description containing a bound variable (the student xi)? First of all, Fox assumes
that movement of a phrase triggers the introduction of a k-binder, co-indexed with
the copy of the QP. As a result, the structure assigned to the example in (65a) would
be (67):15
15 Here I assume, following Sauerland (2004), that the index is just on the determiner inside the copy
trace.
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(67) [every student] kxi. Sue talked to [everyi student]
Second, the copy trace is converted into a definite description by an operation
dubbed trace conversion, which consists of two sub-operations: variable insertion
and determiner replacement.16
(68) Trace conversion (Fox 2002)
a. Variable insertion: (Detn) Pred ? (Detn) [Pred ky (y = xn)]
b. Determiner replacement: (Detn) [Pred ky (y = xn)] ?
the [Pred ky (y = xn)]
After trace conversion, (65a) is analyzed as in (69) below, where the student xi is
shorthand for the (ky. y is a student & y = xi).
(69) [every student] kxi Sue talked to [the student xi]
Assuming that the definite operator inserted by trace conversion is the standard
presuppositional definite article, whose entry is given in (70) below, a descriptive
trace gets interpreted as shown in (71) below.
(70) [[the]]w,g = kP\e,t[: A!x P(x). ix.P(x)
(71) [[the student xi]]
w,g = ix. [[student]]w,g (x) & x = g(i)
if A!x [[student]]w,g (x) & x = g(i), otherwise undefined.
Given that (71) basically reduces to (72), we can conclude that a descriptive trace is
interpreted like a pronoun (or a nondescriptive trace)—in the sense that its value is
provided by the variable assignment function—but with the presupposition that this
value is in the extension of the predicate NP at the world of evaluation.
(72) [[the student xi]]
w,g = g(i) if [[student]]w,g (g(i)), otherwise undefined.
At this point, one can easily verify that the truth conditions of (65a) derived under
the standard QR-based analysis in (65b) are equivalent to those derived assuming
the copy theory of movement and Fox’s trace conversion mechanism. (In fact, the
LF in (69) is interpreted in the following way: (given an arbitrary world w) for every
x, if x is a student in w then Sue talked to the student x in w.) In the next section, I
am going to show how Fox’s descriptive traces can be employed in the derivation of
set readings.
16 Fox (2002) suggests a possible way in which trace conversion could be reduced to a single operation:
‘‘Irene Heim (p.c.) points out that the definite article is the only determiner that can appear in natural
language in the environment ___ NP a where a denotes an element of type e. This observation, she
suggests, might make it possible to derive Determiner Replacement as a necessary consequence of
Variable Insertion’’ (Fox 2002, fn. 6).
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5.3 Deriving set readings
We have established that a copy trace is interpreted as shown in (73) below. From
(73), we can also derive (74), which we will need when looking at intensional
contexts.
(73) Copy trace interpretation:
[[the Pred xi]]
w,g = g(i) if [[Pred]]w,g (g(i)), otherwise undefined.
(74) Identity of copy traces across worlds (preliminary version):
Given two arbitrary worlds w and w0, [[the Pred xi]]
w,g =
[[the Pred xi]]
w0,g if [[Pred]]w(g(i)) = 1 & [[Pred]]w
0
(g(i)) = 1,
otherwise [[the Pred xi]]
w,g = [[the Pred xi]]
w0,g is undefined.
Let’s now see how copy traces can help us derive set readings. Consider (75) in the
context provided below, which makes the set reading salient.
Suppose, John’s task is to assign to a new phone a number that is not yet taken
by any other phone [in this office]. Then he needs to know every phone number
not in the sense of knowing which number is whose, but merely in the sense of
knowing which numbers are somebody’s at all. (Heim 1979)
(75) John knows every phone number (in this office).
Set reading: For every actual telephone number in this office (413-678,
413-254, etc.), John knows that it is somebody’s telephone number.
Under the copy theory of movement, (75) has the LF in (76a) below (recall that
we are assuming IOD in cases where a relational noun is interpreted
intransitively).
(76) a. [every IOD (phone#)] John knowsCQ-se [every IOD (phone#)]
b. [every IOD (phone#)] kx1 John knowsCQ-se [the IOD (phone#) x1]
After trace conversion, the copy at the tail of the chain is converted into
the definite description the IOD(phone#) x1, whose denotation is given in (77)
below.
(77) Descriptive trace (after trace conversion):
[[the IOD (phone#) x1]]
w,g = g(1) if g(1) is a phone number in w, otherwise
undefined.
Since the denotation of the descriptive trace is an entity of semantic type e, in order
to combine it with knowCQ-se we would have to employ IFA. This time, though, the
kind of individual concept generated is a partial constant function, i.e. a function
that is defined only for those worlds in which the trace picks out a phone number.
This suffices to avoid trivial truth conditions. The compositional derivation of the
truth conditions of (75) is shown in (78a,b) below.
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(78) a.
b. For any constituent a and variable assignment g,
[[kiT a]]
w,g = kxT. [[a]]
w,g[i/x]
c. [[John knows every IOD (phone #)]]w,g =
Vxe(Aue [phone#(u)(x) in w] ? Vw0 [ DoxJ(w)
([[the IOD (phone#) x1]]
w0, g[1/x] = [[the IOD (phone#) x1]]
w, g[1/x]))
Now, assume that (75) is uttered in a scenario in which it is true that for every actual
phone number x, John knows that x is a phone number. In this scenario, the formula
in (78c) is true. In fact, in this scenario, (78c) is equivalent to (79) below.
(79) Vxe (Aue [phone#(u)(x) in w] ? Vw0 [ Doxj(w) (Aze [phone#(z)(x) at w0]))
According to (79), the sentence John knows every phone number is true (under its
set reading) if and only if for every x that is actually somebody’s phone number,
John believes that x is somebody’s phone number. These are the intuitive truth
conditions of the sentence under the set reading.
Unfortunately though, as the careful reader may have spotted, this analysis of set
readings is not quite correct yet. As a matter of fact, correct results follow only in
case John knows what the right phone numbers are, as in the given scenario.
Suppose, instead, that John is not right about which numbers are phone numbers in
this office. In fact, he happens to have them all wrong. Intuitively, (75) is false in
this scenario. However, given the truth conditions in (78c), the principle stated
in (74), and the fact that John is not right about any of the existing phone numbers,
we predict the sentence to lack a truth value. This is because, given the facts, the
descriptive trace on the left side of the equation in (78c) would be undefined under
any possible value of x (because for every phone number x, John does not know that
x is a phone number, hence the denotation of the copy trace is undefined in his belief
worlds). Thus, we predict that the sentence lacks a truth value, instead of being
false. What we need instead of (74) is (80) below.
(80) Identity of copy traces across worlds (final version):
Given two arbitrary worlds w and w0,
[[the Pred xi]]
w,g = [[the Pred xi]]
w’,g iff [[Pred]]w,g (g(i)) = [[Pred]]w’,g (g(i))
Clearly, this problematic result is the direct consequence of the presupposition
introduced by the definite article during trace conversion. Two potential solutions
present themselves. We might either resort to local accommodation of the
202 I. Frana
123
presupposition or, in intensional contexts, employ a definite operator that does not
carry a presupposition of existence. In what follows, I will explore this second
possibility. More precisely, I propose to remedy the problem by inserting a
maximality operator during trace conversion, instead of the presuppositional definite
article used by Fox.17
5.4 Copy traces in intensional contexts and max
Correct results obtain if we assume that the definite operator inserted by trace
conversion is the max operator defined in (81) below. This operator is a standard
maximality operator (cf. Rullmann 1995, for example), with an additional clause
designed to deal with empty sets.18
(81) For any set A (i.e. the extension of a predicate NP in w),
(i) if A = [ then, max (A) = ix [x [ A ^ Vx0 [ A [x0 B x]]
(ii) if A = [ then, max(A) = * (the null individual, which is not in
any natural language denotation)
According to clause (i) of the above definition, when max applies to the extension of
a predicate in a given world (a set), it returns the maximal element of that set (an
individual when the set is a singleton set, or an individual sum when the set consists
of more than one individual). The clause in (ii) says that if the set picked out by the
predicate is empty, then max(A) returns the null individual. This last clause is going
to solve our problem. Let’s also assume the modified trace conversion mechanism in
(82), which is identical to Fox’s except that during determiner replacement, max is
inserted, instead of the.
(82) Modified trace conversion
a. Variable insertion: (Detn) Pred ? (Detn) [Pred ky (y = xn)]
b. Determiner replacement: (Detn) [Pred ky (y = xn)] ?
max [Pred ky (y = xn)]
As (82) shows, after variable insertion, max combines with the predicate ky.
Pred(y) & y = x1 whose extension in any given world w can be either the singleton
set containing the value assumed by the variable x under a given assignment
(when x is Pred at w) or the empty set (when x is not Pred at w). From the way max
is defined, it follows that when it applies to a singleton set it returns the
single (maximal) element of that set, and when it applies to the empty set, it
returns the null individual. This amounts to (83). On the basis of (83), the equation
17 Note that a Russellian entry for the definite article would not work for our purposes. This is because
the definite description generated in this way would be a generalized quantifier, which cannot serve as the
direct object of the verb.
18 The proposed solution implies the existence of strange objects in De usually referred to as null or
absurd individuals. Such objects have been previously employed in the literature on choice functions to
resolve the ‘empty NP-restrictor’ problem (cf. von Stechow 1996; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997). My
proposal is close to von Stechow’s (1996) analysis.
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‘[[max Pred xi]]
w,g = [[max Pred xi]]
w0,g’ can be false, unlike ‘[[the Pred
xi]]
w,g = [[the Pred xi]]
w0,g’.19
(83) Copy trace interpretation (with max)
[[max Pred xi]]
w,g = g(i) if [[Pred]]w,g (g(i)), otherwise [[max Pred xi]]
w,g = *
Now consider again the sentence John knows every phone number, which gets
analyzed as shown in (84a) below (in the formula below, read phone# as
IOD(phone#)). Assume next that the trace conversion mechanism in (82) converts
the lower copy into the descriptive trace max phone# x1.
(84) a. [every phone#] kx1. John knows [everyi phone#]
b. [every phone#] kx1. John knows [max phone# x1]
Now consider the truth conditions we derive for (75) under its set reading:
(85) [[John knows every phone#]]w,g =
Vxe ([[phone#)]]
w,g (x) ? Vw0 [ Doxj(w)
([[max phone# x1]]
w0,g[1/x]) = ([[max phone# x1]]
w,g[1/x]))
In case John knows, for every existing phone number x, that x is a phone number,
(85) is true just as (78c) is. However, if John does not have the right knowledge
about phone numbers, the sentence is correctly predicted to be false. This is because
the descriptive trace to the left side of the equation in (85) is no longer undefined.
Instead, it picks out the null individual for every possible phone number x that is not
a phone number in John’s belief worlds. It follows, then, that the equation to the
right of the arrow is false under at least some assignments. Given that the antecedent
of the conditional is true under at least some assignments, the whole conditional is
false. Hence, the formula in (85) correctly captures the fact that the sentence is false
in this scenario.
To conclude: The copy theory of movement and Fox’s trace conversion
mechanism provided us with a way of accounting for set readings within the IC-
approach. When we looked closely, however, the solution worked only for part of
the data (just the true cases). The analysis wrongly predicted false sentences to lack
a truth value (due to presupposition failure). In this section, I showed one way to
solve this problem, by introducing a different definite operator during trace
conversion. With the introduction of the maximality operator in (81), we derive the
correct truth conditions for set readings.20
19 Note that if both copy traces denoted the empty individual *, then the equation [[max Pred
xi]]
w,g = [[max Pred xi]]
w0 ,g would be true. Such cases never arise with factive predicates like know, but
they are possible with nonfactive predicates (cf. Sect. 7.2).
20 The difficulty discussed in this section potentially generalizes to any use of Fox’s copy traces, as long
as intensional operators are involved. However, treatment of the general problem of the interaction of
copy traces with intensional operators is beyond the scope of the present paper. I will leave a complete
resolution of this issue for the future.
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5.5 A unified account of quantified and indefinite CQs
Quantified CQs with other types of 1-place predicate NPs can be accounted for in
the same fashion. For instance, a sentence like (50), repeated below in (86a), will be
analyzed as shown in (86c).
(86) a. Bob knows every member of the Italian soccer team.
b. Set reading: For every member of the Italian soccer team x, Bob knows
that x is a member of the Italian soccer team.
c. [every (ITsocc-member)] kx1. Bob knowsCQ-se [max ITsocc-member x1]
The denotation of the descriptive trace can combine with knowCQ-se by IFA.
Following an analogous computation to the one provided for the set reading of John
knows every phone number, we arrive at a formula equivalent to (87).
(87) [[Bob knows every ITsocc-member]]
w,g =
Vxe (x is an ITsocc-member at w ? Vw’[ Doxb(w)[x is an ITsocc-member at w0])
According to (87), (86a) is true in a world w iff for every x who is actually a member
of the Italian soccer team at w, Bob believes that x is a member of the Italian
soccer team. These are the intuitive truth conditions of the sentence under its set
reading.
Now that we have provided an analysis of set readings with quantified CQs, we
could treat the indefinite examples in the same way. Thus, indefinite CQs, just like
other quantified phrases, will have to undergo QR. When the NP-CQ is a 1-place
predicate, as in (88a) below (repeated from (56b)), the copy trace at the bottom of
the chain denotes an entity of type e ((88c)), which can combine with knowCQ-se by
IFA. k-binding of the variable inside the descriptive trace creates a 1-place predicate
that combines with the denotation of the indefinite CQ by FA, yielding the truth
conditions in (89) below.
(88) a. Ram knows a shortcut to UMass.
b. [a UM-shortcut] Ram knowsse [a UM-shortcut]
c. [a UM-shortcut] kye Ram knowsse [max UM-shortcut ye]
(89) [[Ram knows a shortcut to UMass]]w,g =
= Axe [x is a UM-shortcut in w &




= Axe [x is a UM-shortcut in w & Vw0[ Doxr(w)(x is a UM-shortcut in w0)]
According to the formula above, (88a) is true in w iff there is an actual shortcut to
UMass in w of which Ram believes that it is a shortcut to UMass. These truth
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conditions correctly describe the CQ-reading of (88a). Thus, it seems that our
amended IC-approach can take care of the indefinite cases as well.21
6 Pair-list readings revisited
6.1 Pair-list readings under the amended IC-approach
Although we don’t need to amend the IC-approach to account for pair-list readings, we
could minimally modify the analysis given in Sect. 3 to make it consistent with our new
view of traces. We will continue assuming that pair-list readings involve quantification
over meaningfully sorted ICs. This is again achieved by applying Nathan’s IC-shifter
to 2-place NP-CQs (hence the correlation between pair-list readings and relational
nouns). However, in the new version of the IC-approach, the trace left by movement of
the quantified phrase is trace-converted into a copy containing a bound variable of type
\s,e[. The procedure is shown in (90)–(91) below.
(90) a. Mary knows every capital. (pair-list reading)
b. [every IC(capital)] Mary knowsCQ-se [every IC(capital)]
c. [every IC(capital)] kfse. Mary knowsCQ-se [max IC(capital) fse]
(91) Trace conversion (with variables of type \s,e[)
a. Variable insertion: (Det) Pred ? (Det) kg\s,e[[IC(capital)(g) & g = f1]
b. Determiner replacement: (Det) Pred ? max (kg\s,e[[IC(capital)(g) &
g = f1])
In this case, the result of applying max to the extension of an IC-predicate
returns (when the set is not empty) an individual concept, which can combine with
knowCQ-se by FA.
21 Could the assumption that indefinite CQs must QR turn out to be problematic? Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.)
suggests that sentences in which the CQ contains a negative polarity item (NPI) under the scope of a
negative verb might turn out to be problematic. Consider (i) below.
(i) John is unaware of any mistakes in his proof.
If the indefinite NPI in (i) was a CQ, according to our account it should undergo QR. In this way, the e-
typed descriptive trace left by movement could combine with the CQ-embedding predicate being
unaware of (which presumably requires an IC-denoting internal argument) by IFA. Now, if the NPI
underwent QR, it would be outside the scope of its licensor (the negative verb being unaware of), whereas
if it didn’t move, it could not serve as the argument of the verb; hence the paradox. However, despite the
existence elsewhere of clear CQ-readings with a predicate like being unaware of (see the examples in (ii)
below), (i) above may in fact not have a real CQ-reading which we could paraphrase as ‘John is unaware
of what the mistakes in his proof are’ or ‘There are mistakes in John’s proof but he is not aware of what
they are’. The judgments I collected leave unclear whether (i) has such a CQ-reading, or whether the
sentence simply means that John is not aware of mistakes in his proof (which may or may not exist).
(ii) a. Many people are unaware of the calorie content of alcohol. (BBC News, April 17, 2009)
b. Many consumers are unaware of the price they pay for milk, and their busy lifestyles




(92) Mary knows every capital (pair-list reading)
a.




c. [[Mary knows every capital]]w,g =
Vf\s,e[ [Axe Vw*[f(w*) is the capital of x at w*] ?




In this case, the content of the descriptive traces is semantically redundant—because
the property denoted by IC(capital) is not world-dependent and is already
guaranteed by the restriction of the quantifier. Thus, the formula above reduces to
the simpler formula in (43b), repeated below.
(93) [[Mary knows every capital]]w,g =
Vf\s,e[((Axe Vw*[f(w*) is capital-of x at w*]) ?
Vw0 [ Doxm(w) [f(w0) = f(w)])
6.2 A problem: pair-list readings with nonfunctional nouns
In this section, I point out a problem for the IC-approach concerning pair-list
readings with nouns that are relational but not functional. In the original version of
the IC-approach, as well as in the revised version, pair-list readings are analyzed as
involving quantification over meaningfully sorted ICs. Quantification over ICs (as
opposed to individuals) is implemented, under both versions of the IC-approach, by
applying Nathan’s IC-shifter to the denotation of a 2-place predicate. 2-place
predicates could be functional (denoting a function from individuals to individuals)
or simply relational (denoting a relation between individuals). So far, we have
ignored this distinction and worked primarily with functional nouns such as price, or
capital. However, a closer look at pair-list readings with nouns that are relational
but not functional will reveal that Nathan’s IC-shifter is only suitable for creating
IC-predicates from functional nouns. I propose that pair-list readings with
nonfunctional relational head nouns should be accounted for by quantifying over
pairs of individuals rather than individual concepts.
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6.2.1 Failure of the IC-shifter
We have focused so far on nouns like capital, price, etc., which are not just
relational but also functional. However, pair-list readings are also possible with
relational nouns that are not functional, as shown by (94).
(94) Julia knows every phone number.
Nowadays, people may have multiple phone numbers, corresponding to their landline,
cell-phone, office, etc. Thus, a noun like phone number is relational, but not
necessarily functional. In fact, while (95a) is a perfectly natural sentence, (95b) is not.
(95) a. The secretary knows every phone number of Dr. Smith.
b. #The cashier knows every price of milk.
Notice that Nathan’s IC-shifter is defined to apply to relational nouns in general,
whether functional or not. Thus, an application of Nathan’s IC-shifter to phone
number would create the IC-predicate in (96).
(96) [[IC(phone#)]]w,g = kf\s,e[ Axe Vw0 [[phone#]]
w0,g(x)(f(w0))
However, there is a problem. If a given person has more than just one phone number,
Nathan’s IC-shifter no longer individuates ICs in the right way. To see why, consider a
very simple model with only two possible worlds, w0 and w
0. Suppose further that there
exist only two individuals, Mary and Sue, and that at both worlds Mary has two phone
numbers, 413-000 and 414-000, whereas Sue has only one phone number, 415-000
(below, I simplify the phone numbers by omitting the last 3 digits).
(97) Toy model: w0: Mary has phone numbers 413 and 414,
Sue has phone number 415
w0: Mary has phone numbers 413 and 414,
Sue has phone number 415;
other irrelevant differences from w0
Now suppose that w0 is the actual world, whereas w
0 is the world according to
Julia’s beliefs; thus Julia has the right knowledge of phone numbers. Intuitively, in
these circumstances, the pair-list reading of (94) should come out true. However, an
application of Nathan’s type-shifter would cause the sentence to come out as false.
Indeed, by applying the IC-shifter to telephone number as defined in our toy model,
we would create the set of ICs in (98).
(98) [[IC(phone#)]]w = kf\s,e[ Axe Vw* [f(w*) is a phone number of x at w*]
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Each IC in this set is a properly individuated concept, according to Nathan’s IC-shifter.
Nevertheless, if this turns out to be our domain of quantification, we would wrongly
predict the sentence to be false in the described scenario because IC(phone#) contains
functions such as c4 and c5, whose values are different at w0 and w
0.
One may try to fix this problem by having each individual concept in IC(phone#)
map every world w into the sum of x’s phone numbers at w. If we allow this option,
the denotation of IC(phone#) in our toy model would be the set of ICs in (99).
(99)
Given (99), we would now correctly predict the sentence Julia knows every phone
number to be true in our toy model, because it is true that each individual concept
denoted by IC(phone#) yields the same value at w0 and at Julia’s belief worlds w0.
However, although this adjustment would solve the problem for quantified CQs
headed by every, it would not work with CQs headed by other quantifiers, such as
numerals, no, or most, as in (100) below.
(100) a. Julia knows three phone numbers.
b. Julia knows no phone numbers.
c. Julia knows most phone numbers.
In all of these examples, we seem to be counting pairs consisting of a person and
one of his/her phone numbers, not just holders of phone numbers. Take (100a), for
example. Given the circumstances described in our toy model, (100a) is intuitively
true since Julia knows a total of three telephone number/individual pairs: two
telephone numbers of Mary and one telephone number of Sue. However, if (99) is
the denotation of IC(phone#) in our toy model, there will be only two ICs in our
domain of quantification instead of three. Therefore, the sentence would come out
false, contrary to our intuitions.
Similarly, consider (100b) in a slightly modified scenario, like the one
summarized in (101) below. Assume again that w0 is the actual world and w0 is
the world according to Julia’s beliefs. This time, though, Julia is wrong about all
phone numbers except one—namely, one of Mary’s phone numbers.
(101) Toy model: w0: Mary has phone#s 413 and 414,
Sue has phone# 415
w0: Mary has phone#s 413 and 417,
Sue has phone# 416;
other irrelevant differences from w0
Intuitively, under the circumstances described in the toy model above, (100b)
should be false, given that Julia is right about one telephone number. However, if
the set of ICs denoted by IC(phone#) is the set in (102), we would wrongly predict
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the sentence to be true in the given scenario, since it is true that all the ICs in this set
yield different values at w0 and w0.
(102)
Because of the facts just discussed it seems reasonable to conclude that the IC-
shifter is not the right tool to capture pair-list readings for CQs headed by
nonfunctional relational nouns.
6.2.2 The PAIR-shifter
Correct results obtain if instead of Nathan’s IC-shifter, we employ a new type-
shifter, defined in (103) below.
(103) [[PAIR(a)]]w,g = kre. Axe. Aye. r = \x, y[ & [[a]]
w(x)(y)
(treating ordered pairs as included in De)
Applying the PAIR-shifter to the denotation of a relational noun like phone number
returns a predicate of pairs (104).
(104) [[PAIR(phone#)]]w,g = kre. Axe [Aye [r = \x, y[ &
y is a phone number of x at w]]
When the PAIR-shifter is used, the object of knowCQ-se is a function from possible
worlds into pairs of individuals (e.g., a person and one of her/his phone numbers).
The pair-list reading of (94) has the LF in (105c) below.
(105) a. Julia knows every telephone number.
b. Pair-list reading: For every pair \x,y[ such that y is a telephone
number of x, Julia knows that y is a telephone
number of x.
c. every PAIR(phone number) kre J. knowsCQ-se [max PAIR(phone#) r]
Since the denotation of the descriptive trace is by assumption a definite of semantic
type e, it must combine with knowCQ-se by IFA. k-binding of the variable inside the
descriptive trace creates a predicate of pairs which combines with the denotation of
every phone number by FA, yielding the truth conditions in (106).
(106) [[Julia knowsCQ-se every phone #]]
w,g
= Vre [[[PAIR(phone#)]]
w,g(r) ? Vw0 [ DoxJ(w)
([[max PAIR(phone#) r1]]
w0,g[1/r] = [[max PAIR(phone#) r1]]
w,g[1/r])]





According to the formula above, (105a) is true in the actual world w iff for every
pair r consisting of an individual and one of his/her phone numbers, Julia believes
that the two individuals forming the pair r are in the ‘phone-number-of’ relation.
These are the intuitive truth conditions of the sentence under its pair-list reading.
6.2.3 Why the IC-shifter cannot be eliminated
At this point one may wonder whether we should eliminate the IC-shifter altogether,
and replace it with the PAIR-shifter whenever we need to derive pair-list readings.
Although this move may seem attractive, as it would simplify the analysis quite a bit,
the IC-shifter does not always reduce to the PAIR-shifter. In fact, the IC-shifter seems
necessary to account for the meaning of (107) below (from M. Kaufmann, p.c.).
(107) John knows the price that hasn’t yet been determined.
Assume that the price that hasn’t yet been determined is the price of milk. In this case,
(107) is interpreted as meaning: ‘John knows that the price of milk is the price that
hasn’t yet been determined’. It is obvious that for (107) to be true, John does not have to
believe that milk costs what it costs (given that its price hasn’t been fixed yet), nor that
the pair consisting of milk and its price in dollars stand in the ‘price-of’ relation.
Instead, what has to have the same value in John’s belief worlds and in the actual world
is the complex concept picked out by the price that hasn’t yet been determined. What
(107) says is that this concept (of semantic type \s,\s,e[[) must have the same
extension in the actual world and in John’s belief worlds; i.e. the extension of this
function in John’s belief worlds must be the individual concept the price of milk. The
meaning of (107) can be rendered along the lines of (108) below:22
(108) J.knowsCQ\s,\s,e[[ [the IC(price) kfse. thef IC(price) not-determined\s,e[]
Here is another example, which one could address in the same way. The example
is due to Philip Bricker (p.c.) and it goes like this: suppose the country of Fredonia
is a kingdom where it is established that the next ruler of the country is always going
to be the first legitimate heir of the current reigning couple. Suppose John, a citizen
of Fredonia, knows this fact: would we assent to the truth of (109) even if the next
ruler of Fredonia has not been born yet? The answer seems to be yes.
(109) John knows the next ruler of Fredonia.
Setting aside an implausible acquaintance reading, (109) in this scenario does not
express a belief towards a particular individual who happens to be the next ruler of
Fredonia, given that such individual does not exist (yet), nor towards a pair
consisting of a country and his ruler. Instead, it expresses a belief towards a
22 Here, I am following Romero (2005) in assuming a flexible denotation for knowCQ that can derive
readings with arbitrary high meta-knowledge (by FA or IFA).
(i) [[knowCQ]]
w = kys kxe Vw0[ Doxx(w) [y(w0) = y(w)] where s = \s,e[ or \s,\s,e[[ or…
Quantified concealed questions 211
123
particular individual concept—in this case, the IC the first heir of the current
reigning couple of Fredonia. Like before, the DP-CQ ‘the next ruler of Fredonia’
will denote a more complex concept of type \s,\s,e[[, and it is the extension of
such a function that has to be the same at the actual world and at John’s belief
worlds (i.e., John believes that the next ruler of Fredonia is the first heir of the
current reigning couple of Fredonia, whoever that individual may be).
More complex examples that also seem to point to the conclusion that the IC-shifter
cannot be replaced by the PAIR-shifter involve nested CQs. Heim (1979) discovered
that sentences with nested CQs, such as (110), have two possible readings: assuming
that the only capital that Fred knows is the capital of Italy, (110) is ambiguous between
a ‘question’ (Q) reading and a ‘meta-question’ (MQ) reading.23
(110) John knows the capital that Fred knows. (Heim 1979)
Q-reading (A): Fred knows the capital of, say, Italy, and John knows
it too. (I.e., John, like Fred, knows the answer to the
question ‘What is the capital of Italy?’)
MQ-reading (B): John knows which capital Fred knows. (I.e., John knows
the answer to the meta-question ‘Which capital-question
does Fred know the answer to?’)
Without getting into the details of how one may account for such ambiguity (see
Heim 1979; Romero 2005; Roelofsen and Aloni 2008; Schwager 2008; Percus
2009; Frana 2010, a.o.), I simply want to point out that MQ-readings cannot be
derived with the PAIR-shifter. In intuitive terms, this is due to the fact that—under
this reading—the sentence is true as long as John is able to tell which capital-
question Fred knows the answer to, without knowing the answer to this question
himself. Thus, John does not have to have a belief towards a particular pair
consisting of a country and its capital. Rather, what we are checking is the value of a
higher concept of semantic type \s,\s,e[[ across different worlds.24
23 Roelofsen and Aloni (2008) observe that sentences with nested quantified CQs like ‘John knows every
capital that Fred knows’ are actually 4-way ambiguous, as a result of the interaction between set/pair-list
readings and Heim’s Q/MQ ambiguity. In Frana (2010) I propose an account of this ambiguity within the
general approach given in this paper. For alternative accounts see Roelofsen and Aloni (2008), Aloni and
Roelofsen (2011), Percus (2009, 2010), and Romero (2010).
24 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss higher-typed readings, it should be pointed out
that when applied to sentences with CQs denoting individual concepts (Q-readings) or intensions of
individual concepts (MQ-readings), the IC-approach can derive their truth conditions with the tools at
hand, i.e. the IC-shifter, Romero’s flexible denotation for know, (c.f. footnote 22) and (intensionalized)
FA. However, for higher-typed CQs (where the intension of the CQ is of type \s,\s,\s,e[[[)—as in
example (i) below from Romero—we would also need an entry for the NP-CQ predicate that
characterizes a set of \s,\s,e[[ concepts. This would require the introduction of a different IC-shifter
(or a family of IC-shifters) from the one used in this paper. Reflections on this point are left to further
research. Thanks to an anonymous NALS reviewer for bringing this issue to my attention.
(i) John knows the price Fred knows: the price announced yesterday morning. (Romero 2005, p. 695)
(Fred knows the answer to the MQ ‘What price was announced yesterday morning?’, while John
knows the answer to the MMQ ‘What price does Fred know?’.)
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To conclude: We saw that in the case of pair-list readings with relational nouns
that are not functional, Nathan’s IC-shifter no longer generates a suitable domain of
quantification. Correct results obtain if instead of Nathan’s IC-shifter, one employs
the PAIR-shifter defined in (103), which shifts the denotation of a 2-place predicate
into a predicate of pairs. In this way, pair-list readings with nonfunctional relational
nouns are rendered by quantifying over pairs of individuals, instead of properly
individuated ICs. However, the PAIR-shifter cannot substitute for Nathan’s IC-
shifter in all cases, and quantification or abstraction over variables of type \s,e[
cannot be completely eliminated from the grammar.
7 Further issues
7.1 Set readings with temporally intensional verbs
An individual-concept-based analysis of pair-list and set readings, like the one given
in this paper, leads us to expect that these readings should appear not only with CQ-
sentences but, more generally, with sentences whose main verb selects for
individual concepts. In fact, this seems to be the case. Consider the following
example from Nathan (2006).
(111) After the elections, every governor changed.
The example above has a quantified NP subject (whose head noun is relational) and
the verb change, which—under its intensional interpretation—selects for individual
concepts. As Nathan points out, (111) has two possible interpretations.25 Under one
of these interpretations, the sentence is true if and only if the whole set of governors
before the elections is replaced by an entirely new set of governors after the
elections. Under the other interpretation, the sentence can be true if the overall set of
governors stays the same from one time to another, but the individual governors
swap their jobs (i.e., the governor of Maine at index i becomes the governor of
Massachusetts at index i0, and so on). Schwager (2007) calls the type of change
involved in the first reading set change and that involved in the second type of
reading pointwise change. Furthermore, Nathan notes that pointwise change
readings are not always available. Compare the example above with (112), where
the head noun of the NP subject (song) is not relational. Intuitively, while (111) can
be true in a situation in which the overall set of governors stays the same across time
but the individual governors swap their jobs, a sentence like (112) can only mean
that every song in Jan’s iTunes library has been replaced with a new one and that the
resulting set of songs is different from one time to the other (set change).
(112) (After Meredith made fun of his musical taste,) every song in Jan’s
iTunes library changed.
25 There is also a third, ‘extensional’ reading (according to which each governor changed some of his/her
personal features), which does not concern us here.
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Set change and pointwise change readings bear a striking resemblance to set and
pair-list readings of quantified CQs. In fact, I argue that they are exactly the same
phenomenon: set change readings are just like set readings in that they appear with
1-place predicate NPs and involve quantification over individuals, whereas
pointwise change readings are just like pair-list readings in that they appear with
2-place predicate NPs and involve quantification over individual concepts, or pairs.
Consider another example of a set change reading:
(113) Every bodyguard of Arnold changed. (Schwager 2007)
The sentence in (113) has two readings, an extensional and an intensional one. Assume
that Arnold has two bodyguards, Bruce and Duke. Under the first (extensional) reading
of (113), the sentence says something about Bruce and Duke in their role as
bodyguards, i.e. that they changed some of their personal qualities. Under the second
(intensional) reading, (113) says that Arnold’s bodyguards are no longer the same, i.e.
Bruce and Duke have been replaced. According to Schwager, in the first case, change
acts as a predicate of individuals, while in the second reading, it acts as a predicate of
individual concepts. If we accept this reasoning, then we have to face the following
question: what are the individual concepts that we are quantifying over in (113)? Given
that we are talking about the bodyguards of Arnold, we obviously cannot individuate
these functions via the internal argument of the relational noun. Moreover, if the
internal argument of the relational noun has been saturated (by the individual denoted
by Arnold), an application of the IC-shifter is not even possible, since this type-shifter
can only apply to relational nouns. Clearly, this is the same problem raised by
quantified CQs with 1-place predicate NPs (set readings). Without drawing
comparisons with existing accounts of these data (see Nathan 2006 and Schwager
2007), the point I want to make here is simply that the analysis of set readings given in
this paper extends to the apparently problematic set change readings as well. Thus,
(113) can be analyzed as shown in (114). Since the trace in base position is a copy with
descriptive content, the verb can operate on the intension of the copy trace by
Intensional Functional Application.26
(114) [every bodyguard of Arnold] kxi [max bodyguard of A. xi] has changed\s,e[
To conclude: the fact that pair-list and set readings are found with quantified NPs in
temporally intensional contexts (i.e., with verbs like change that also select for
individual concepts) further supports an individual-concept-based analysis of
quantified CQs.
7.2 Set readings with nonfactive verbs
The way the present account derives set readings crucially relies on two mechanisms:
QR and descriptive traces. Thus, the set reading of a quantified CQ-sentence is derived
as shown below.
26 In order to derive the truth conditions of (114), we need to think about the lexical semantics of
temporally intensional verbs, like change, and about the way the temporal dependency introduced by the
verb interacts with tense and aspect. I will leave this point open for future research.
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(115) a. John knows every phone number (in this office).
b. [every IOD(phone#)] kx1 John knowsCQ-se [max IOD(phone#) x1]
Note that this way of deriving set readings always amounts to quantifying over
actual instantiations of the predicate NP—in the case at hand, over actual phone
numbers (because of QR, the quantified DP is interpreted outside the scope of the
intensional verb). With factive verbs like know, this is not an issue. However, as an
anonymous reviewer points out, set readings are also possible with nonfactive verbs
like agree on. Consider the following scenario:
Reviewer’s scenario: John and Mary are the two secretaries in an office.
Although they are both quite chaotic, they are usually reliable when they agree
on some piece of information. The office manager, Smith, needs to assign a
phone extension that is not yet taken by anybody in the office to a new
employee. He asks John and Mary what the (already assigned) extensions are.
John tells him 212, 213, and 214. Mary tells him the same. But in fact John’s
and Mary’s shared belief is completely wrong this time: the phone numbers
already assigned are 215, 216, and 217.
(116) Smith: John and Mary disagree on many things, but they agree on every
phone number. So I will trust them on this and choose a number different
from the ones they gave me.
As the reviewer points out, the underlined statement in (116) is true in the above
scenario. However, when interpreting (116), we seem to confine our attention to
those numbers that are phone numbers according to John and Mary, not to actual
phone numbers. Suppose that agree on has a lexical entry that selects for individual
concepts, just like knowCQ-se, except that in this case, we are comparing the value of
a concept across (at least) two sets of doxastic alternatives. The entry in (117)
below, which adopts Lahiri’s (2002) idea that the lexical semantics of agree on is
inherently reciprocal (and thus based on agree with), would serve our purposes.
(117) Semantics for agree on\s,e[:
Agree (w) (X) (f) iff for all x, y in X:
Vw0 Doxx(w) Vw00 Doxy(w): f(w0) = f(w00)
(118) a. John and Mary agree on Sue’s phone number.
b. Vw0 Doxj(w) Vw00 Doxm(w):
SUE’S PHONE NUMBER(w0) = SUE’S PHONE NUMBER(w00)
Let us return now to set readings. Our analysis would assign the following LF and
truth conditions to a sentence like John and Mary agree on every phone number
(under the set reading). In (119b) below, read phone# as IOD(phone#).
(119) a. [every (phone#)] kx1 J.&M. agreeCQ-se [max (phone#) x1]
b. Vxe ([[phone#)]]
w0 (x) ? Vw0 [ Doxj(w0) Vw00 Doxm(w0):
([[max phone# x1]]
w0,g[1/x] = [[max phone# x1]]
w00,g[1/x]))
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Unfortunately, this formula overgeneralizes. In case John and Mary do agree on
every phone number and their beliefs are correct, the formula correctly predicts the
sentence to be true. In the reviewer scenario, where John and Mary agree on every
phone number but their beliefs are incorrect, the formula is also true—given that
both descriptive traces would return the null individual, resulting in the tautological
(embedded) proposition ‘* = *’. However, the formula above predicts the sentence
to be true as long as x is a phone number in the actual world but not a phone number
in John and Mary’s belief worlds, even if John and Mary do not, in fact, agree on
any phone number. It seems, then that the account of set readings given for factive
predicates does not naturally extend to nonfactive predicates. It could be that the
maximality operator needs further refinements, or that the lexical semantics for
agree on differs in substantial ways from the simplified entry in (117). Investigating
this issue, however, would require more time and space than available here.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I proposed an account of quantified CQs with different types of NP-
predicates—an account which derives the truth conditions of pair-list and set
readings. I argued that the availability of pair-list vs. set readings correlates with the
type of NP-CQ involved (functional, relational, or nonrelational). Table 1 below
provides sample sentences for each type of NP-CQ and shows how different CQ-
readings are derived within the proposed account.
As shown in Table 2 below, pair-list readings correlate with 2-place NP
predicates and involve either quantification over meaningfully sorted concepts
(functional nouns) or quantification over pairs of individuals (relational nouns). Set
readings, on the other hand, correlate with 1-place NP predicates (these are
Table 2 Shifter/reading correlations
Type of NP-CQ Shifter Domain of quantification Reading
2-Place (functional) IC-shifter Meaningfully sorted concepts Pair-list
2-Place (not functional) PAIR-shifter Pairs of individuals Pair-list
2-Place IOD-shifter Individuals Set
1-Place No shifter Individuals Set
Table 1 The distribution of pair-list and set readings
Sample sentence Type of noun/shifter Pair-list reading Set reading
Sally knows every capital. 2-Place: IC(capital) H
1-Place: IOD(capital) H
The secretary knows every phone number. 2-Place: PAIR(phone#) H
1-Place: IOD(phone#) H
Sally knows every book you like. 1-Place: no shifter H
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predicates whose head noun is either lexically nonrelational or consists of a
relational noun whose internal argument has been saturated overtly or covertly via
IOD) and involve quantification over individuals.
Regardless of the type of noun involved, the account of quantified CQs given in
this paper relies on the following two syntactic assumptions: (i) the quantified
phrase is not interpreted in situ (i.e., it undergoes QR); and (ii) the trace left in base
position is a copy with semantic content. The account itself is cast within the IC-
approach (Heim 1979; Romero 2005), i.e. it postulates that a CQ-embedding
predicate, like know, selects for individual concepts.27
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